Egregores, Group Minds, and White Magic

Is there such a thing as a group mind? If so how does it affect the thriving and surviving of groups? What do such group minds look like from a historical perspective? What about a modern perspective?

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I- Erik Hoel’s “The egregore passes you by

Recently I had a chance to catch up on some newsletters I’d been saving. Among them was

Erik Hoel

‘s excellent piece “The egregore passes you by”. Hoel is a neuroscientist who has been putting out some truly great ideas. (See for example his recent piece Nerd culture is murdering intellectuals.) But before we can get to them, or my brilliant expansion of them, we need to answer one very important question:

What the heck is an egregore? 

An egregore is a “non-physical entity that arises from the collective thoughts of a distinct group of people.” Hoel uses egregore to introduce the idea of a group mind, while simultaneously charting the history of that idea. Back in the late 19th century, some educated Londoners, including William Butler Yeats, took an interest in the occult. Inspired by this new found obsession these men founded the secret Hermetic Order of the Golden Dawn. The members of this society dabbled with many esoteric constructions, including the summoning of benevolent egregores.¹

Egregores are Hoel’s way of introducing his real subject: group minds; but why does he claim that egregores (or group minds) are passing us by? One imagines, rather, that they would be sucking us into their dark, eldritch, but hopefully benevolent, embrace. Hoel does make it sound more like the latter than the former, and I think “the egregore folds you into its penumbral expanse” would have been a better title, but he didn’t ask me. 

With the arcana of egregores out of the way, Hoel’s primary thesis is that the Hermetic Order of the Golden Dawn was onto something. Namely, that group minds are possible and social media may be in the process of creating one, or more likely many.

In order to arrive at this conclusion he starts by discussing people who have undergone a corpus callosotomy, an operation which severs the connection between the two hemispheres of the brain. This procedure is exceptionally helpful for those suffering from extreme epilepsy, but it has interesting effects beyond that. It turns out in these so-called split-brain patients that the two hemispheres don’t always agree. For instance, if you isolate visual fields and feed one hemisphere one set of information while feeding the other a different set, the hemispheres may enter a cognitive cage match of sorts. This disagreement can take many forms, but a classic manifestation is the subject's two hands working in opposition to one another, for example one hand buttoning a shirt while the other hand tries to unbutton it.

These disagreements imply that there are two separate consciousnesses and that if we could reverse the corpus callosotomy the subject would return to just having one consciousness. In consciousness research this is called the binding problem. Presumably you could reunite the two hemispheres; the point of Hoel’s piece is to wonder how far beyond that you might be able to extend the process: 

Less remarked upon was that the work on split-brain patients implied a radical conclusion: imagine that you could use futuristic neurotechnology to reintroduce communication between the two hemispheres. Wouldn’t there then be some moment when—pop!—the two streams of consciousness go back to being one?

Go further: imagine future scientists connecting two separate brains with the same technology, perhaps via dense optical fibers strung out between the test subjects carrying the signals of neurons. Upon cranking up some dial controlling the amount of communication and synchronization, wouldn’t there also be a pop?

Okay, go even further: there are no fiber optics, merely communication, but it’s incredibly high-bandwidth and all the time, text and images flashing in front of eyes, and it involves everyone on this blue and green globe.

The pop heard round the world.

(Is the pop a bottle of champagne being uncorked? A starter’s pistol? Western Civilization being taken out back and shot?)

II- Low-bandwidth Group Minds?

The question which immediately occurs to me is, does it have to be high bandwidth? The answer seems to be “no.” Hoel gives several examples of low-bandwidth phenomena that could exhibit similar properties. 

To begin with, ants work in concert for the good of the colony, passing information through pheromone trails. Given their singular focus, it’s easy to imagine that an ant colony represents a slow-moving group mind. This is an interesting observation, but what we really wanted to know is how it would work with humans. Hoel has this to say:

What if, as philosopher of mind Ned Block has asked, each citizen of China devoted themselves to carrying out the individual signaling of a neuron? This would then create a “China brain” which mimicked in functionality a real brain (although you would need about two more orders of magnitude to get close to approximating a full human brain in terms of numbers of neurons/citizens). There would be, at least functionally, an equivalence.

Why should China have all the fun? Hoel goes on to mention “weird philosopher of mind” Eric Schwitzgebel who wrote an article “If Materialism Is True, the United States Is Probably Conscious.” Hoel quotes Schwitzgebel:

Of course it’s utterly bizarre to suppose that the United States is literally phenomenally conscious. But how good an objection is that? Cosmology is bizarre. Microphysics is bizarre. Higher mathematics is bizarre. The more we discover about the fundamentals of the world, the weirder things seem to become. Should metaphysics be so different? Our sense of strangeness is no rigorous index of reality.

All of the foregoing about ants, China, and America is in service of showing that the idea of group minds is something serious neuroscientists take seriously. But even if they didn't, I think the idea of group minds in the era of social media is both fascinating and worth exploring. Indeed, the phenomenon of group minds in the era before social media might be even more consequential. This is something beyond the bounds of Hoel’s piece, and possibly outside the bounds of serious neuroscience as well. But you know me, I’m on a mission to go where serious neuroscientists fear to tread.

What would be an example of a pre-social media group mind? Religions come to mind (pun intended); not merely “classical” religions but civic religions. This observation immediately raises all sorts of questions. Each of which could be the subject of its own post, but for now, in the interest of sparking discussion, I’ll briefly list a few:

• Can someone be part of multiple group minds? Sure. Why not? But I can also see minds being created at the nexus. That there’s a Catholic American group mind in addition to a Catholic group mind and an American group mind, and one might belong to all three.

• Does this actually mean that groups are conscious? Well, in one of his previous posts Hoel gave, what he said, was a well-accepted definition of consciousness: “that there is something it is like to be that organism”. Does America have a sense of itself? Do a search for that phrase and you’ll find that this exact idea comes up a lot.

• What is the point of a group mind? Is it just an unavoidable consequence of how our minds work?  An emergent property that’s interesting, but not particularly consequential? Something similar to culture but not a primary driver of events?

• Or do group minds jockey for power, position and status in the same way normal minds do? Are some group minds better than others for doing some things? Are they subject to evolutionary pressure?

• Is it possible for a group mind to go insane?

For an examination of these questions let’s start with the example of American civil religion. What we might label patriotism — though it’s unclear if that covers all of the features of this particular group mind— it will do for now. If one were to look for peak efficiency and unity — that is, peak group-mindedness — you would have to pick World War II. Every man, woman, and child in the nation was focused on winning the war.² In this context it’s not just America that’s interesting, when we consider my last question about group mind insanity, it has often been remarked that Germany as a whole seemed to have lost its mind. And really it seems that all the belligerents could be described as having powerful and very cohesive group minds which allowed them to prosecute the war with a fervor that now seems somewhat foreign. Certainly we’ve seen hints of this fervor with Ukraine, and more lately Israel and Gaza, but obviously some sort of significant threat is necessary for it to coalesce. 

All of this leads one to wonder if we could ever recreate the World War II group mind. If not, what have we lost?

Intermission

Things are going to get a little speculative from here on out, so before they do I want to just lay down what I feel are the non-crazy, likely to be true bits from this post:

1. There is an actual phenomenon which could usefully be labeled a “group mind”.

2. These group minds are capable of being formed even if the bandwidth is low.

3. When it comes to group flourishing, group minds can be either beneficial or harmful, but they are generally not neutral.

4. Identifying which conditions cause a group mind to end up in one bucket or the other would be useful.

III- The Care and Feeding of Group Minds

Clearly traditional group minds are not something that emerged just in the 20th century. If we accept that a nation might have a group mind, I’m sure such minds have been around for at least as long as there have been nations and probably a lot longer than that. It should be equally obvious that while some groups used their collective mind to triumph and thrive, others ended up on the losing side of things and perished. Once again the conflict between the United States and Germany is a great example of this process. 

But, after thousands of years, it would appear that something new is happening: internet and social media group minds. I would refer you to Hoel’s piece for a detailed examination of these minds, though I will tell you that it’s largely negative — an assessment I agree with. In particular I think that in the sorts of conflicts I just mentioned where triumphing is a matter of life or death these new group minds are almost entirely useless, because they’re so fractured, and ephemeral.

It would appear that one effect of new communications technology is to increase the number of supportable group minds. 

The printing press enabled the Protestant Reformation and an enormous flowering of denominations. 

Radio and TV more firmly established an urban/rural divide, a coastal/rest of the country divide, while also giving us tribes of sports fans.

The internet has been the most disruptive of all, now we have everything from niche feminists group minds to Pokémon group minds. 

As this process has continued the link between the group minds and the people composing them appears to be weakening. In the past, Catholics and Protestants as well as Americans and Germans fought and died. While direct violence has not completely disappeared — see the feminist group mind link above — these days calls to violence and the conflict between group minds takes on different forms. Additionally membership in a given group mind is far more fleeting.

Under these radically different conditions how do group minds thrive or perish? We covered such a process with traditional group minds, but how would it work with those created on and by social media? How do group brains evolve? How are they selected for or against? What makes an evolutionary robust group brain as opposed to a fragile one? How might the answers to all of these questions be different now that social media is on the scene?

I don’t have the answer to most of these questions, but I can point out some interesting ideas. Fortunately while I was working on this piece I was gifted with a great example of many of the relevant issues when Ayaan Hirsi Ali announced that she was now a Christian. I’m sure she had many reasons for her conversion, but it’s clear much of her reasoning boiled down to the idea that Christianity is a powerful group mind. Clearly not as powerful as it once was, but nevertheless one of the few things that might be capable of dealing with the other dysfunctional group minds it finds itself in competition with. Which includes both things like China and Russia, but also the numerous and fractured new group minds Hoel is talking about. 

Equally interesting are some of the responses to her declaration, in particular Michael Shermer’s. Shermer made an appearance in this space not that long ago. He’s not only a noted atheist, but also a close friend of Hirsi Ali’s. They were both considered prominent members of the New Atheist movement until Hirsi Ali’s aforementioned conversion to Christianity. 

One of the most interesting things about Shermer’s response is that it boils down to a debate over which group mind is best equipped to meet the challenges and threats of the future. Shermer grants that atheism isn’t a group mind:

Let me explain in the spirit of respect for what is on the line here, starting with the subtitle of Ayaan’s essay: “Atheism can't equip us for civilisational war.” She’s right, but not in the way she thinks.

Atheism per se can’t equip anyone for anything because it is not a belief system or worldview.

In contrast to Hirsi Ali’s advocacy for Christianity, Shermer offers Enlightenment humanism and scientific naturalism. But do these two closely related forces really represent a group mind? I would argue that they do not. To be clear Shermer doesn’t use the phrase group mind and that’s part of the problem. In essence, Hirsi Ali is saying we can only confront our current challenges with a robust and unified group mind, in the same way the group mind of patriotism allowed America to confront Nazi Germany. Shermer’s response misses the point. Interestingly in much the same way he accuses Hirsi Ali of missing the point. It’s true that atheism can’t equip us for anything because it’s not a belief system; but neither is Christianity. 

To be more precise, Christianity is more than a belief system, it’s a group mind. 

Hirsi Ali is saying that we need white magic. We need a benevolent egregore to confront the many malevolent egregores which threaten us. 

Shermer counters by advocating for science and humanism, but both of these things are the opposite of magic. They not only aren’t benevolent group minds, they're destructive of them. 

IV- Skepticism and Egregores

At the core of Enlightenment humanism and scientific naturalism is skepticism. And much of this skepticism is directed at traditional group minds, such as religion or a nation’s sense of itself. 

Let’s use patriotism as an example. I’m old enough to remember attending school and being taught that Columbus was both bold and visionary. I also remember discussing the founding fathers, and never hearing that many of them owned slaves. And of course things like this barely scratch the surface of America’s many sins. 

Once you start to exercise skepticism towards the many claims of America’s civic religion and its claims to exceptionalism there’s all manner of things to discover. Continue down this rabbit hole and eventually you arrive at a very different sort of egregore. We’ve seen alarming examples of just this thing in the wake of Hamas’ attack of 10/7. To the surprise of many, including me, we’d managed to cultivate a very powerful anti-colonial, anti-western, anti-american egregore, which is only now emerging into the light.

Of course this is not the first time we’ve encountered an anti-American egregore. We saw something very similar during the Vietnam War, but I think it was more grounded back then. Young Americans were being forcibly enlisted to fight and die in a war they didn’t support. Israel’s invasion of Gaza after the horrific events of 10/7 doesn’t seem anywhere close to that. The reaction to Vietnam was an understandable reaction that coalesced into a necessary movement. The reaction to Israel's invasion of Gaza seems like a wholly disembodied egregore — a construct of belief and emotion.

Belief would seem to be the key, moreso when we’re talking about benevolent egregores. (Negative ones might be fueled by pure hate.) In fact I would go beyond belief to say that they require faith. Skepticism is the opposite of faith; as such, Enlightenment Humanism and scientific realism rather than providing a robust group mind is part of the force tearing such group minds apart. 

Hoel isn’t the first person to discuss group minds. Historically those who did imagined that gradually the entire human race would be part of one big benevolent group mind. (Stay tuned for a review of a book by just such a person.) Our differences would disappear to be replaced by harmony, empathy, and understanding. That has not been the case. Hoel touches on this a little bit, but in reality what we’ve ended up with is a proliferation of niche egregores, each small, but monomaniacal. 

In part this condition has come about because of the internet and social media. It doesn’t matter how utterly obscure your fanaticism is, you can now find other people who share it. This is the part of the equation that everyone knows. But there’s another part to it that’s less well known: the rampant skepticism underlying the whole edifice of the internet. Belligerent argumentation, out-group vs. in-group fights, and detached irony are all forms of skepticism. Rather than large, benevolent religions that unite nations and civilizations (albeit imperfectly) we’ve ended up with tiny, malevolent, ever-evolving egregores. 

When Hirsi Ali says we need white magic and angels, Shermer responds that demonic familiars are plentiful and offer far more power. 

And you know what? He’s right. Science is super cool, and Enlightenment humanism has accomplished amazing things. I’m committed to defending free speech even if it’s yet one more thing whose primary utility is encouraging skepticism.

But the questions remain: How are we to balance the unity and effectiveness of traditional group minds with the skepticism that has given us so much knowledge? Can we harmonize the white magic of belief and faith with the dark magic of playing with forces we barely understand? Is it enough to say that we’ve taken the latter too far and we need to slow down? Is there some happy medium we can strive for? If so, how shall we identify it? I certainly hope that we construct a system where a robust civic religion is paired with the perfect amount of skeptical inquiry, but I’m doubtful. I think those two trends converged serendipitously in the post-war era, and this is one of the reasons why people still long for that time. But it appears to have been a fluke, and not something we can easily recover. 

I fear that what we witnessed was a rare celestial convergence, and now skepticism is slowly nearing its perihelion while belief and unity drift ever deeper into the darkness of the heavenly abyss.  

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This is my first original, non-patheos, non-book review content for several months. I apologize for the lengthy pseudo-hiatus. I can’t promise it’s entirely over, but I think we’re past the aphelion and headed back towards the Sun. It’s been long enough that I’m not even sure what that will be like, but I guarantee it will be worth sticking around for.

1. Apparently it was very important that you lock in their benevolence early in the process, or who knows what you might end up with. You may notice echoes of this our current AI debate.

2. Okay obviously not EVERY one. But the complete dissipation of organized opposition to the war after Pearl Harbor was amazingly comprehensive and swift.