If you prefer to listen rather than read, this blog is available as a podcast here. Or if you want to listen to just this post:
I.
This post is a continuation of the last post, but it’s okay if you came straight here without reading my previous post. When you’re writing you always have a destination in mind, and sometimes that destination seems pretty close, and you figure you have time to take a detour, so when you pass a sign that says, “World’s Largest Ball of Twine! 25 miles!” You think, “Sure we have time to go see that,” but the next thing you know you’ve not only spent hours traveling back roads, but you’re deep into the competing claims over which ball of twine really is the biggest, and you decide to travel to all of them, and… Well you get the picture.
With that introduction, if you understandably decide not to go back and read the last post, here is a distillation of the three claims I made:
- Uniting large groups of people is very difficult, and it’s a project that ultimately comes down to your foundational epistemology. How does a system construct the truth which goes on to inform its policies?
- When looking at these foundational epistemologies technocrats would seem to have an edge because in theory they arrive at the truth, they don’t construct it. But not only does their method have some notable blind spots, it’s also not very good at uniting the masses. It may, in fact, have the opposite effect.
- Religion is something that is both very good at constructing a truth framework and uniting people, and that is what we used to have in this country in the form of a patriotic civic religion, but that recently we had abandoned it, and the hole left by its absence is large contributing factor in the current unrest.
To give you an example of what I mean here, let’s take something smaller than an entire theory of government. The above is also essentially the point I’ve been making when it comes to the Modern Monetary Theory (MMT), the alternative macroeconomic theory that’s been much discussed recently. It may be that the MMTers have genuinely figured out some more accurate model for how government debt works. (Though I doubt it, even Krugman has referred to it as Calvinball.) But more important than the accuracy of the idea, is how it ends up getting translated when it filters down to citizens/voters. The average voter has no interest in the actual wonky policy debate. They have no understanding of monetary supply or inflation or the dollar’s status as a reserve currency. Consequently they’re either going to ignore the whole debate, or it’s going to get translated into something they can understand. The most likely candidate for the latter is a conviction that deficits don’t matter and the government can spend whatever it wants, and so what possible reason could there be for not spending money? Particularly if people are in need.
Now of course it’s going too far to say that this conviction would be equivalent to a religion. It may be easier at this stage of things to view such an idea as a myth. A myth which is a distortion of MMT, but which arises out of it in a fairly natural fashion. And even if we imagined that people could understand all of the ins and outs of Modern Monetary Theory, you can see how the myth is much more appealing. Not merely is it simple and straightforward, but it appeals to their self-interest. When given a choice between doing the hard work of understanding the in-and-outs of things, listening to the experts, or believing a simple and compelling myth. Most people are going to go with the myth. Technocracy imagined that most people even even if they’re reluctant to do the hard work, will still go with believing the experts, but that’s simply not the case,
What’s actually happening is that people are choosing between two myths. The other myth is a myth about debt. It is also simple and compelling. It says that debt is bad. As it turns out that’s not the case, governments need to be able to borrow. This is what makes it a myth, but it’s nevertheless a simple and straightforward idea that people can organize around. Experts, such as they are, may direct people towards one or the other myths, but essentially they’re a side show.
II.
As I mentioned in that last post there are lots of books that speak to the importance of religion, but since we’re starting with myths and working our way up to religions, let’s start with Sapiens by Yuval Noah Harari. In yet another stab at explaining the uniqueness of humans Harari puts forth the idea that our uniqueness comes from our ability to craft these myths. That through myth-making we can create imagined orders and frameworks, which allow us to exceed the limits set by the natural order. You might notice that this is very similar to the other candidate for “human uniqueness” I recently mentioned in my review of The Secret of Our Success by Joseph Henrich. For Henrich it was culture, for Harari it’s myths, but as you can imagine the two end up having substantial overlap.
Now, in the interest of full disclosure, it’s been awhile since I read Sapiens, and my note taking back then had not reached its current heights. Fortunately I did come across a blog post where someone had summarized the book. Accordingly, for convenience, I’ll be referencing that rather than Harari’s book.
In doing so let’s review what we’re trying to do. Our overarching question is how do we beneficially unite large groups of people. Well setting aside the “beneficial” bit for the moment. Historically, uniting people above the level of a tribe has always begun with the application of force, or at least a form of power which was ultimately backed up by such force. I’ve talked about this before at some length, but as it turns out, even though in that last discussion I peeled away the veneer of democracy, I didn’t go deep enough. There was at least one more layer. From the Sapiens summary:
A natural order is a stable order. There is no chance that gravity will cease to function tomorrow, even if people stop believing in it. In contrast, an imagined order is always in danger of collapse, because it depends upon myths, and myths vanish once people stop believing in them. In order to safeguard an imagined order, continuous and strenuous efforts are imperative. Some of these efforts take the shape of violence and coercion.
To say that a social order is maintained by military force immediately raises the question: what maintains the military order? It is impossible to organise an army solely by coercion. At least some of the commanders and soldiers must truly believe in something, be it God, honour, motherland, manhood or money.
To maintain an imagined order, we need people who believe in it – the military, the elites, and the peasants.
In other words behind the threat of force is a myth that makes the force cohere into something useful, and beyond that myths are ultimately responsible for all cohering even if you’re not talking about the military—as our recent myth-induced chaos bears testament to. But if all power structures are ultimately built on a foundation of belief in some myth, then what myth forms the foundation of a modern technocracy? I suspect the answer is that there isn’t one, and as I concluded in my last post, this lack represents its fundamental weakness. But it’s only fair that we consider some possibilities before definitely concluding that.
III.
A technocracy is rule by technical experts. So perhaps the foundational myth is in the power of experts. Like all good myths this would be one with quite a bit of truth behind it. But is that all that’s required for a good myth? That it be a simplification of some more complicated truth, designed for easy ingestion by the masses? Probably not, at least as I consider examples of unifying myths, the amount of truth they contain seems mostly incidental to their success. What really seems to determine how successful they are is the emotional appeal of their core idea. To return to the other two frameworks I talked about in my last post: national greatness and Trumpism. The former’s emotional appeal is right there in the name. The powerful idea that the United States is a nation with a destiny! While the latter both borrows the appeal of the former—Make America Great Again—and the age-old appeal of unifying around a single, charismatic figure. In this case the idea that Trump is a transformative figure in his own right, something of a Moses who will set his people free. Do you see any similar appeal around the idea of “listen to the experts”? I don’t. It sounds more hectoring than inspiring, as I think recent events have shown.
What if we take it back a step and make our unifying myth the myth of science. Well we’re immediately faced with an oxymoron, since science is all about puncturing myths, or at least getting to the bottom of them. Which is to say the great strength of science, that it is self-critical, is exactly what we don’t want in this situation. It prioritizes doubt, but unity requires at least some degree of certainty. You can neither imagine someone storming the Capitol in the name of science nor facing down such a mob in the name of science either. You can imagine both happening in the name of justice or duty, but not science.
Perhaps technocracy can unify people using the myth of progress? This seems like the best candidate, and to the extent that technocracy has been successful this is probably the unifying myth it has drawn on. But I think there are several reasons to think that this myth isn’t really capable of “going the distance” as they say. First off, while progress doesn’t come embedded with quite the same level of doubt as science it still invites a certain amount of criticism and reflection. All of which is to say that people feel they should be able to measure progress, and that, because it’s “progress” every time they measure it, there should be more of it. This gives progress a certain fragility. As long as progress is obvious it makes a great unifying myth, but if it stalls or reverses or takes a form that’s difficult to quantify, it’s utility as a myth quickly disappears. Also what if you end up with progress in some areas, but not in others? And what if some groups are doing great while things are getting worse for other groups? Suddenly progress isn’t unifying, it’s divisive. Which, once again is something we’ve seen play out in recent events.
Perhaps the key problem with all of these myths is that in order for a myth to be useful it has to inspire people during both the good times and the bad. It has to not merely unify people when things are going great—nearly anything will work for that. No, it’s when times are tough that a unifying myth is put to the test. Does it continue to function when unity is both important and difficult? In order to do this there has to be something about the myth which encourages sacrifice, or at the minimum naturally assembles people into teams. One could argue that a great nation shouldn’t have to sacrifice, but at least that myth encourages everyone to want their nation to win, and from there the necessity of making sacrifices becomes pretty obvious.
In the final analysis technocracy may be antithetical to both unity and sacrifice. Under the idea of national greatness we’re all citizens, all part of the vast arc of destiny that has carried the United States from a hall in Philadelphia, through numerous wars against evils like slavery and facism, all the way up to walking on the Moon. Trumpism is not nearly so majestic, but it nevertheless formed people up into teams and gave them a goal to strive for. Even democracy at its most vanilla puts forth the idea that every voter has a part to play in government. But a technocracy contains none of these elements. The average citizen isn’t part of something grand they’re just a piece in a puzzle the technical experts are trying to solve. Through their behavior they may make the puzzle easier or more difficult to solve, they are not the prime movers in the story. They’re not the people playing the game of chess, they’re the pieces on the board. (I can’t decide if using the word “pieces” in two different contexts is clever or confusing…)
There is one other important point to be made in this discussion: unity can either be something which is cultivated internally or it can be imposed externally. I’m not going to spend a lot of time going down this path since I covered it in a previous post, but I would argue that the long period we’ve experienced without any wars has also contributed to our lack of unity. War’s have rarely been truly existential threats for the United States, but even so, knowing that great harm will befall you unless you pull together with the rest of the country is a powerful motivation to do just that. And as I mentioned in the last post, it is during such times as war, or in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 that the feeling of national greatness always reached its peak.
At this point you may agree that myths are useful, you may even agree that technocracies are bad at cultivating unifying myths, but you might still think that they’re more effective, by virtue of the fact that they’re based on science, evidence and data rather than conspiracies (Trumpism) or a history which has been white-washed of all the bad things (national greatness). That in the long run technocracies will be a better framework for beneficially unifying people than any framework which relies on simplifying myths. This would appear to be the contention of a lot of people, and one of the great debates of the age. Let’s see if we can get to the bottom of it.
IV.
To start with I’m going to jump ahead somewhat. I’m going to go straight from talking about myths to talking about religion. Ideally I would carefully build that progression, but I think it’s pretty obvious that religions are collections of myths. Myths which happen to be based on eternal truths if you’re a believer, or myths which may nevertheless be useful even if you’re not. But clearly everything I said above about myths—that they are coherent, easy to understand, and inspiring during both good times and bad—also applies to religious beliefs. It might even be useful to think of religions as mythplexes—aggregations of useful myths.
If we accept that religions are the preferred framework for managing people via myths, then that’s what we should be measuring technocracies against. And unless I’ve completely missed the point, its supporters make the fundamental claim that technocracies are better than religions at unifying large groups of people. Regardless of whether we’re comparing it against traditional religions like Hinduism or Christiantiy. Or comparing them against civic religions, like the ideology of patriotic national greatness which held sway in the US until very recently. Though calling this a “fundamental claim” may give an inaccurate impression of how much attention technocrats pay to this comparison. I think most of them consider this superiority so blindingly obvious as to be unworthy of discussion, not something people are still fighting over. If this is the case, where are technocracies superior? What standards are we using for our comparison, and how does one even make the comparison? If we have a modern Scandanavian technocracy on one side, and, say, Christianity on the other, what are we looking for?
Obviously this is a big subject with a lot of potential areas where one could focus. Also it’s one where my opinion by itself isn’t worth very much. Fortunately, as I mentioned in the last post there are numerous books that have weighed in on this subject. Though before I dive in, it’s obvious I’m biased on this subject, and it’s almost certain that this bias extends to the selection of books I’ve read. So the fact that I can come up with far more books making the case for religion, than making the case for secular technocracies, may say more about me than about the state of scholarship on the subject. Accordingly if you know of any books making the case for technocracies which I haven’t read please let me know. The chief one I’m aware of is Enlightenment Now by Steven Pinker, and I’m not going to spend any time with it, because I already did a whole post on it, and this post is focused on the religious side of the debate.
With those biases noted, let’s take a look at what we’ve got. I’ll be covering a lot of books, so by necessity I’m going to be brief, but in nearly all cases I’ve reviewed these books already and I’ll link back to those, more extended discussions. And in the one case where I haven’t discussed the book I’m about to so you’ll just have to tune back in at the beginning of March.
Let’s start with the book in this last category, a book I just finished The WEIRDest People in the World, by Joseph Henrich. This one has a particularly interesting contribution to make on the topic. First off it makes the claim that just about everything you might think of as attributes of a modern technocracy is the result of Western Christianity’s “Marriage and Family Program” (MFP). That this MFP produced WEIRD people, an acronym which stands for:
- Western
- Educated
- Industrialized
- Rich
- Democratic
These five words are also among the first words someone might think of when describing a technocracy, which would mean that technocracies aren’t in competition with religions; they are in fact only possible after hundreds of years of religious influence! Now this still leaves open the argument that technocracies are the stage of evolution past religion, that they are an improvement, which we will get to in a minute, but at a minimum I think anyone making this sort of argument would carry the burden of proof.
Beyond this WEIRDest People also spends a lot of time pointing out the enormous changes religion was able to make through the MFP, taking thousands if not tens of thousands of years of kin based organizational structures and remaking them into structures capable of much greater cooperation across a much larger number of people. Exactly the sort of beneficial organization I keep referring to.
As long as we’re on the subject of Henrich, his other book, Secret of Our Success, makes the strong case for the power of cultural evolution to organize societies as opposed to the method of rationally arriving at solutions and policies. Does not the former essentially describe the development of religion? While the latter is nearly an exact description of the technocratic mindset?
A Secular Age, by Charles Taylor, makes much the same point as WEIRDest People, though from a very different angle. In Taylor’s case he spends 900 pages disproving the idea that secularization is a story of subtracting the bad bits of religion (for our purposes, if we equated “bits” to “myths” that’s pretty close to the mark). In place of this he argues that secularization has been an additive process, that everything associated with it was built on a vast foundation of progress that was driven by religion in all of its aspects.
Clash of Civilizations by Samuel Huntington, makes the comprehensive claim that civilization is impossible in the absence of religion. That all civilizations have to be built around the framework of a common system of myths and beliefs.
That’s four books, to these we could easily add four more: Marriage and Civilization by William Tucker, together with Sex and Culture by J.D. Unwin which (along with WEIRDest People) all make the point that monogamous marriage is critical to civilization as we understand it. Perhaps technocracies share religion’s dedication to this subject, if so I’ve yet to come across any evidence of it. There’s also Seeing Like a State by James C. Scott, which is yet another indictment of technocracy’s ability to plan and manage complex societies, with illustrations of how long it takes for such failures to manifest. Finally there’s Tribe by Sebastian Junger, which speaks to the deep dissatisfaction and the lack of unity so many people experience while living in modern technocracies.
To these eight I could add still more, but that’s enough for now, and as I said, my own studies of this subject may be biased, and if so I welcome correction. But, as far as I can tell, religion has been absolutely critical to developing the society we currently have and we abandon it in favor of a secular technocracy at our peril. Though as I said perhaps technocracy is a natural evolution from where we were. Either an advancement which eliminates the need for religion or one which ushers in some new quasi religion which will fill the hole left by traditional religions.
V.
Even the most cursory review of the state of the world would have to conclude that technocracies are not doing well. This is not their moment, and it’s hard to discern any sense in which they have allowed us to transcend the need for myths and religions. They have not demonstrated any permanent and unshakable advantage over previous forms of government. In fact, at the moment they seem very shaken. But even more than their current distress, we get the best evidence in favor of my thesis when we look at what has shaken them.
Obviously, I am most familiar with the US, and here, when you dig into what’s happening to shake the foundations of the technocratic order, it’s myths as far as the eye can see. There’s the myths underlying Trumpism, which were powerful enough to rally 74 million voters. There’s the myths of police violence against minorities, but particularly blacks, which were powerful enough to give us a whole summer of protests. There’s the myths of a socialist revolution sweeping away late-stage capitalism in an environmentally friendly way, which have provided enduring support for Bernie Sanders and The Squad. And somewhere in there, there is still the myth of national greatness, and American exceptionalism.
Like all good myths these are all based on a significant body of truth, but that’s not what makes them powerful. Technocrats who come along and point out Trump’s flaws, or that the circumstances of some of the police shootings were not quite as egregious as has been claimed, make very little headway against these myths. More facts are not what the people crave. They obviously crave something the technocrats have a difficult time providing.
To these observations we should add the point that technocracies have not been around for very long, and while perhaps this means we should give them more time—that they have not been given a fair chance. I view it in the opposite fashion. Whatever success they have had, has been during a brief period of exceptional peace and stability. This has provided the illusion that they work, when, as I already pointed out, in good times nearly every system works.
Taken together it seems pretty clear that technocracies are not an advancement which have allowed us to abandon myths and religion, that we still need them as much as ever and technocracies cannot fill that hole. So what about the idea that we might be transitioning to a new civic religion?
I first encountered this idea in the Slate Star Codex post, Gay Rites Are Civil Rites, which right off the bat is a very clever title, particularly given the subject matter. In the post he argued that the old civic religion of national greatness and patriotism, which I’ve spent so much time talking about with its emphasis on patriotism, American History, and a parade on the 4th of July might be getting replaced by a new civic religion which emphasizes tolerance, progress towards the future, and a parade celebrating Gay Pride. For a label you might call it Wokeism, or the Religion of Progress, but regardless of what you call it or what you think about it’s chances for success, it’s a fascinating idea. If you’re interested in the nuts and bolts I would urge you to read that post, because I’ve only scratched the surface. But I do see several issues with the idea:
- As I keep pointing out, one of the key features of a religion is that it works during good times and bad. How does wokeism encourage sacrifice? And not just the sacrifice of advantaged groups for those that have been disadvantaged but the sacrifice of all of its adherents in exchange for something they believe to be the greater good?
- And while it’s possible I could have made this clearer, it’s not that we need a religion, it’s that we need a religion that can unify us all, in the way that national greatness used to unify the nation or the way Christianity unified the West. At least so far whatever Wokeism is, it’s been pretty divisive.
- Even if we grant that it’s a new and better religion which has arrived just in time to replace the old and make us an even better nation. Transitioning to a new religion is not something to be undertaken lightly. Look at everything that went into the creation of the civic religion of patriotism: a revolution, a war, the creation of a new nation built exclusively around the religion, not to mention the extraordinary people. Just George Washington’s contribution as the first president was a huge factor. One that would be difficult to replicate.
Put all of this together and the best case scenario is a tumultuous and contentious transition to a new set of myths with unknown efficacy, and it could end up being something far worse than that. The American Revolution was the best case scenario for transitioning to a new religion. If you want the worst check out the Russian revolution and its aftermath. Still it’s fair to ask what our actual options are.
That’s a tough question. I still think it might be easiest to retreat back to a religion of national greatness, but I’m worried that Trump has rendered that idea permanently toxic to at least half the country. There are of course traditional religions, and perhaps that’s a closer destination, but it doesn’t feel like it. It feels like the path to that destination has been lost for a long time.
I wish there was a simple answer. But I think the overarching lesson here is that, in our hubris, in our certainty that we could just sit down and invent the perfect system, we ended casting aside the only thing that really could have saved us.
People often ask me what I would do if I were in charge. (No, really!) And I’d probably do something both silly and petty. Like make everyone sign-up for my patreon. Click here if you want to get in on it before it’s mandatory.
You bring up some interesting points and I agree that the demise of our civic religion in the U.S. is a real problem for societal health that I would like to see reversed—but I think it’s a category error to compare “technocracy” directly against “civic religion.” The former isn’t really an ideology or set of moral values or anything, it’s mostly just a structure. The latter is mostly an ideology and set of moral values, but not really a structure.
If technocracy is “rule by experts” then I contest that we have it in America. Congress is full of lawyers, the president typically has a management/leadership/politics background, and our most senior government officials are appointed by those politicians, and frequently are not experts either. Lawyers dealing with the law are technocrats, but that doesn’t make them technocrats when they’re outside their actual realm of expertise. Certain European countries may get much closer to this where their career technocrats are much more empowered by their systems of government. I think there’s a problem in saying “rule by” vs. “increased power of the administrate state” or something; there has to be a better way to describe the phenomenon.
Somewhat like the whole argument over the relative merits of meritocracy, I assert that people actually like technocracy when forced to choose between qualifications of doctors.
You separate out science from technocracy, but there’s a lot of overlap there in many cases, like our current public health crisis where we are to “trust the science.” I think you need to specify the difference between science as an iterative, self-correcting, applied epistemology; a body of knowledge; and a body of experts and institutions.
I think Trumpism is clearly anti-epistemology because it’s not particularly coherent or consistent in and of itself (note that the GOP just sort of didn’t have a formal platform for 2020…). It’s a mythology directed at the parts of the status quo its adherents do not like with very little consistency otherwise, and that’s part of its success. In the short term at least, that flexibility of aiming hate at what is hated is a great way to motivate 74 million voters. Hashing out the details would just get in the way of the shared motivation to make the libs cry.
You say: “In our certainty that we could just sit down and invent the perfect system, we ended casting aside the only thing that really could have saved us.”
Who is “our” and are they actually certain or in agreement of a “perfect system”? You seem to be describing a top-down approach to what I think has been a secular (in the economic sense) bottom-up emergence of irreligiosity in modern societies, or at least reduced religious activity for at least the post-WWII time period. I guess I can accept that the “ruling class” or “elites” in many of our educational and government institutions have given up on the legitimacy of our civic religion. I feel like there’s a missing variable of “nationalism” here. I think there are some shared root causes leading to the decay of both organized religion and civic religion, but it‘s hard to disentangle distrust in institutions as a cause vs. effect.
Let’s say for the moment that I accept the differentiation you make between ideology and structure. What was the structure underlying national greatness? If it was a form of technocracy then we’re still missing more or less what I said we were missing. If it wasn’t a form of technocracy, then whatever it was the two together seemed to work better than technocracy alone. And once gain replacing whatever that dual system was with the current technocracy, still seems like a mistake.
But of course I disagree with that differentiation, or at least I don’t think the line separating the two is as bright as you claim. It is possible, as I just said that maybe we need some combination of both for a nation to function, but technocracy seems at best ambivalent to the idea of a civic religion and at worst hostile.
When you say that we have a technocracy in America, you seem to be disagreeing with me, but I’m making the same claim, and specifically I’m making that claim that a Biden administration is more a technocracy than the Trump administration. And yes I’m familiar with the meritocracy/doctor argument (It just came up again on SSC), but part of my argument is that there’s a difference between people’s stated preference and what actually unifies people. And of course when it comes to government you may have misaligned incentives. When we’re talking doctors, incentives are mostly aligned. But at the government level what the technocrats think is best and what the citizens think they deserve might be the exact opposite. As example take Social Security, I can’t imagine that any genuine technocrat doesn’t think it needs some kind of modification, but just try telling the old people that. And, the key point is, if you were going to tell people that, you would have much greater odds of success by appealing to patriotism than appealing to charts.
It is a fair criticism that this statement: “In our certainty that we could just sit down and invent the perfect system, we ended casting aside the only thing that really could have saved us.” is a hasty generalization, and yes, I am talking about the way the “elites” have undermined civic religion. But I agree my statement implies too much intentionality, when clearly it’s a huge and complicated web of causes and effects. But I would be happy to be at the level of deciding who is to blame for the problem because right now we seem to be at the level of not even acknowledging there is a problem.
I think there has been a secular (economic sense) trend in the post-WWII era for both the growth of the administrative/regulatory/legal state (“technocratic drift”) and the deterioration of belief in America’s civic religion and associated norms (from both Left and Right). (How much the underlying causes of those trends relate to declining belief/participation in organized religion is hard to tease out, but interesting to consider.) I think the two trends are related (perhaps directly re: say education), but distinct. What I’m trying to say is that I don’t think technocracy is trying to replace the civic religion; it’s just that the “technocratic” structure/mode (which hasn’t drastically changed in any formal sense since post-WWII I’d say) is just becoming more naked without the supporting ideology shared among most Americans. Something like progressivism/wokeism on the Left and whatever Trumpism is on the Right are attempts at replacing or modifying the civic religion, and it’s not going well. Leaving aside the unresolved squishiness of “technocracy” and “civic religion,” I think it’s clear the latter is an attitude/sense more than a system of applied government or any particular policy framework (Social Security is a fun example in that technocrats on both the Left and Right have changes they want to make, but there is strong bipartisan support for the status quo). A shared civic religion leads to general trust in institutions, but it isn’t the governing institution/mechanism itself.
For example, the U.S. civic religion includes freedom of speech as a pretty important value (and more than just the specific legal right). We’ve seen historic attacks on it mostly from the Right, but of late we have the Left wanting to reduce it, as well as the Right, wherever they feel best (everybody apparently wants social media to allow their speech and ban that of their opponents…). Freedom of speech as a social value isn’t something really on the technocratic scale in my mind; it’s orthogonal. (From my perspective, lots of technocrats are more consistent about supporting freedom of speech as a value than the average American; I think the underlying correlation is education levels but I could be wrong.)
I agree that the Left in general and Biden in particular is much more “technocratic” than the Right and Trump in particular. However, I’d point out that Biden is pretty big on America’s civic religion, as was Obama before him (moderate Democrats typically are). And if you look at who Trump appointed, there were a lot of technocrats in there (but also way more wildcards than usual).
Now that I look at it, maybe we’re operating from different definitions of “civic religion” as well because in my mind it was secular for the secularists but the religionists could have their version of God as appropriate (i.e., it fits in the overlap between secular humanism and generic Christianity + American historical mythology). But the Wikipedia article makes it more explicitly religious: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_civil_religion
Just as I think there are good and bad forms of nationalism, I think there are good and bad forms of the civic religion. My personal favorite description that relates to both concepts is: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Creed
After writing all that, maybe where I’m going wrong is that you’re using “technocracy” primarily as the growing (or remaining) ideology of the elites + bureaucrats + academics as they jettison anything like the old civic religion (and not in the applied sense of a technocracy that I’ve been focused on), and its effects on society at large. I guess my problem there is that Robert Moses was a hell of a technocrat and there’s no way his approach would work in today’s political or regulatory environment, so there’s something key missing from using “technocracy as ideology” too loosely.
As concise summary of what I’m trying to say you could do worse than, “Something like progressivism/wokeism on the Left and whatever Trumpism is on the Right are attempts at replacing or modifying the civic religion, and it’s not going well.”
Also calling a technocracy orthogonal to the issue of a civic religion is a useful idea as well. It’s entirely possible that in my head it seemed like a competition, but you’re right it’s not a competition, technocrats are indifferent to civic religion (or religion in general) and as a result they make no effort to encourage good religion and discourage bad religion, which has in effect abandoned the field to the bad kind.
But despite all that there is a key point where technocracy is opposed to civic religion, even if it’s more of a byproduct then directed action. When they explicitly undermine the epistemological framework. They may appreciate free speech, and appreciate it even more than some on the right or left, but it’s kind of one value among many with no more support than the data than can be assembled in it’s defense. Whereas in the American Civic Religion, it’s not just a Amendment, it’s the First! there’s morality and a fervor to that idea that can’t be matched by a technocracy.
From my vantage point as a professional bureaucrat/technocrat in the DoD (which is obviously different than most of the rest of government, plus selection bias of who works there), the technocrats are quite pro-civil religion/patriotism, but also trying to accomodate Wokeism.
I think we’re getting closer to a shared understanding because I think you’re right when you say technocrats, by and large, aren’t strong defenders of the sacred values of our civic religion by default. I went back and reread your last post on how technocracy != religion and I think that’s a good take (though “scientism” gets dragged as being a religion and naive science is practically mythology based upon the magic of poor statistical practices). An interesting example is how technocrats of one sort (professional historians) recognized the 1619 Project (a pretty direct attack on our civil religion I would say) had some major accuracy issues, but technocrats of another sort (educators) thought it was good enough to build curriculum around (and somehow I doubt most of them will include the critiques). I think that’s the real problem actually, that too many technocrats/elites have become or been captured by Wokeists, and so Wokeism is co-opting the institutions as it tries to replace the civil religion.
I think there is a way to get the epistemology of science/technocracy to complement our civil religion/patriotism and that such a marriage is the best solution to our problems. Maybe I’ll be inspired by you and write an essay.
Interesting thought experiment: If the hit musical Hamilton (which was woke, but also pro-patriotism) was released in the coming year in its original form, what would the reception be? Alternatively, if it were released in the coming year, how would it have been changed to reflect the last 6 years of societal drift?
I wasn’t previously aware of this label, but I think it’s part of what your aiming at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rationalization_(sociology)
If you write something let me know. Not sure about Hamilton, but one could hardly imagine it being the exactly the same, and it’s equally difficult to imagine it being more patriotic.
Good find on the “Rationalization” that does seem to be closer to what I’m talking about than technocracy qua technocracy.
Is the unacknowledged problem you refer to at the end of this comment our society’s apparent lack of a broadly accepted set of unifying myths?
Yes, indeed.